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CASE COMMENTS
Labor Law-PUBLIC RECORDS ACT-DOCUMENTS ACCUMULATED DUR-
ING PRELIMINARY UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE PROCEEDINGS NEED NOT BE
DISCLOSED, UNDER PUBLIC RECORDS ACT, UNTIL SUCH TIME AS
CHARGES ARE EITHER FORMALIZED OR DISMISSED-City of Bartow v.
Public Employees Relations Commission, 341 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1976)*
On January 19, 1976, Teamsters Local Union No. 444 of Bartow,
Florida, filed a charge with the Florida Public Employees Relations
Commission alleging that the City of Bartow had engaged in an
unfair labor practice by withholding overtime and holiday pay from
police department employees actively supporting the union.' A
Commission staff member undertook a preliminary investigation of
the allegations to determine whether there was substantial evidence
indicating a prima facie violation of the applicable unfair labor
practice provision.2 The investigator compiled affidavits, as well as
other documents and notes relating to the charge, from police de-
partment employees. Three months later, while the preliminary in-
vestigation was still in progress, counsel for the City asked the inves-
tigator to furnish copies of these documents, in accordance with the
Public Records Act. 3 The investigator declined to produce the docu-
ments, stating in a letter that to do so would impede the Commis-
sion's investigative ability and violate assurances of confidentiality
given to affiants. The City's attorney then directed a similar request
to the chairman of the Commission, noting that the City needed the
documents for evaluation and preparation of its defense to the pend-
ing charges, and assuring that no action was contemplated against
any employees based on information in the documents. The matter
* This paper was judged to be the best in the Florida State University Law Review Writing
Competition, Spring 1977.
1. Case No. 8H-CA-766-2008, Public Employees Relations Commission (PERC), filed
January 19, 1976. FLA. STAT. § 447.501 (1977) bars public employers from engaging in unfair
labor practices.
2. FLA. STAT. § 447.503(1) (1977) requires the Commission to make a preliminary investi-
gation.
3. FLA. STAT. § 119.01 (1977) provides, generally, for free access to all public records by
anyone desiring to examine them. The various exemptions from this provision are listed in
FLA. STAT. § 119.07(2) (1977). During the 1977 legislative session, FLA. STAT. § 119.07(2)(b)
(1975) was amended to exempt from disclosure certain educational records (ch. 77-60, 1977
Fla. Laws 85); certain records of the Division of Economic Development (ch. 77-75, 1977 Fla.
Laws 128); certain classes of bank and trust company records (ch. 77-94, 1977 Fla. Laws 193);
and specified credit union records (ch. 77-156, 1977 Fla. Laws 665).
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was taken before the entire Commission, which denied access to the
documents.4 The City then petitioned the Supreme Court of Florida
for issuance of an alternative writ of mandamus compelling disclo-
sure of the documents. The court directed the Commission either to
comply with the petition or to show cause why it should not comply,'
and transferred the case to the First District Court of Appeal.6 On
December 21, 1976, the district court of appeal, with Judge Smith
writing the opinion, denied the City's petition for a writ of manda-
mus, holding that while the documents involved were public records
subject to inspection, it was appropriate for the Commission to
postpone disclosure until the preliminary investigation was com-
pleted and the charges were either formalized or dismissed.7
The resolution of the legal question in this case-whether the
Commission is required by the Public Records Act to disclose the
affidavits and documents sought by the City-necessitates a consid-
eration of very basic, yet competing, public policies. Generally a
limited right to examine public records exists at common law,' and
good public policy is said to require liberality in the right of inspec-
tion.' In some jurisdictions the right may be limited to persons who
can demonstrate an "interest" in the materials sought to be exam-
ined;'0 in others, the individual's right to inspect will be weighed
4. The basis for the unanimous vote of the Commission was the need to protect employees
from possible retaliation by the employer at the preliminary stage of the investigation, thus
guaranteeing that the right of any employee to participate fully in the bargaining process
would not be impaired. See Order Denying Respondent's Request for Production of Affida-
vits, Records, Papers, and Notes, PERC No. 8H-CA-766-2008 at 2-5, June 24, 1976. The right
to organize and bargain collectively is secured by FLA. CONST. art. I, § 6, which provides in
relevant part: "The right of employees, by and through a labor organization, to bargain
collectively shall not be denied or abridged."
5. City of Bartow v. Public Employees Relations Comm'n, No. 50,104 (Fla. October 1,
1976) (Alternative Writ of Mandamus).
6. "When the jurisdiction of an appellate court has been improvidently invoked, that
court may . . . enter an order transferring it to the court having jurisdiction." FLA. App. R.
2.1(5)(d).
7. City of Bartow v. Public Employees Relations Comm'n, 341 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1976). The City's petition for rehearing was denied.
8. Gibson v. Peller, 181 N.E.2d 376 (Ill. App. 1962); Nowack v. Fuller, 219 N.W. 749
(Mich. 1928); Halloran v. McGrath, 67 P.2d 838 (Mont. 1937).
9. Gibson v. Peller, 181 N.E.2d at 378.
10. See generally Nowack v. Fuller, 219 N.W. at 750-55, which contains an interesting
discussion of the early English common law doctrine of "right of inspection," effectively
allowing an individual access to official documents only if he could demonstrate a need for
the information in maintaining or defending an action. See also MacEwan v. Holm, 359 P.2d
413, 417 (Ore. 1961). Although a showing of such a specific interest is generally not required
in American jurisdictions before inspection of records is allowed, in Holcombe v. Chandler,
200 So. 739, 744 (Ala. 1941), the Alabama Supreme Court held that a person seeking access
may be properly required to show that he has some direct interest in the document sought
and that inspection is for a legitimate purpose. Often an individual's status as a citizen or
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against any countervailing public interest in nondisclosure."
In Florida and most other jurisdictions, the right to inspect public
records is governed by statute. Section 119.01, Florida Statutes,
provides that "[i]t is the policy of this state that all state, county,
and municipal records shall at all times be open for a personal
inspection by any person.""12  This is a sweeping declaration, ap-
pearing to bestow an absolute right on any person wishing to exam-
ine any public record at any time, without imposing limitations of
any sort. While a review of succeeding sections of the Act demon-
strates that limitations on the public's right of access do exist,"3
there can be little doubt that Florida's statute is a forceful affirma-
tion of the right of the citizenry freely to examine public documents.
The original Public Records Act, enacted in 1909,1 did not define
taxpayer is sufficient to show his "interest" in inspection. See, e.g., Gibson v. Peller, 181
N.E.2d 376 (Ill. App. 1962); Nowack v. Fuller, 219 N.W. 749 (Mich. 1928); Halloran v.
McGrath, 67 P.2d 838 (Mont. 1937).
11. See, e.g., Mathews v. Pyle, 251 P.2d 893 (Ariz. 1952).
12. Forty-six states currently have public records acts in force: ALA. CODE tit. 41, § 145
(1958); ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.100-120 (1962); ARiz. RED. STAT. ANN. § 39-121 (1956 & Supp.
1976-77); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2804 (1968); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6253 (West Supp. 1976);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-72-201 to -206 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-19 (West
Supp. 1976); FLA. STAT. §§ 119.01-.12 (1977); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 40-2701 to -2703 (1975); HAW.
REV. STAT. §§ 92-21, -50 to -52 (Supp. 1975); IDAHO CODE § 9-301 (1947) and § 59-1009, -
1011 (1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 116, §§ 43.4-.7, .101-.113 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977); IND. CODE
ANN. § 5-14-1-1 to -6 (1974); IOWA CODE ANN. § 68A.1-.9 (West 1973 & Supp. 1977); KAN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 45-201 to -203 (1973 & Supp. 1976); Ky. REV. STAT. § 61.870-.884 (Supp. 1976); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44:1-:9, :31-:39 (West 1950 & Supp. 1977); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, §§
401-410 (Supp. 1976-77); MD. ANN. CODE art. 76A, §§ 1-5 (1975 & Supp. 1976); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 66, § 10 (West Supp. 1977-78); MicH. Con. LAws ANN. § 750.492 (Supp. 1977-
78); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 15.17 (West 1977); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 109.180-.190 (Vernon 1966);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 59-512 (1970); NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-712 to -712.03 (1976); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 239.010 (1973); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 91-A:4 to :8 (Supp. 1975); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 47:1A-1 to -4 (West Supp. 1977-78); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 71-5-1 to -3 (1961 & Supp.
1975); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW §§ 85-89 (McKinney Supp. 1976-1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-1
to -9 (1974 & Supp. 1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-04-18 (Supp. 1977); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 149.43 (Page 1969); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 24 (West 1962); OR. REV. STAT. § 192.410 to
.500 (1975); 65 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 66.1 to .4 (Purdon 1959 & Supp. 1977-78); S.C. CODE
§§ 30-3-20 to -50 (1976 & Supp. 1977); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 1-27-1 to -3 (1974); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 15-304 to -308 (1973 & Supp. 1976); TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a
(Vernon Supp. 1976-77); UTAH CODE ANN. 88 78-26-1 to -3 (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, §§
315-320 (1977); VA. CODE §§ 2.1-340 to -342, -345 to -346.1 (1973 & Supp. 1977); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 42.17.250-.340 (Supp. 1976); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 16.61, 19.21 (West 1975 &
Supp. 1977-78); Wyo. STAT. §§ 9-692.1 to .5 (Supp. 1975). For analysis of the public records
statutes of selected other states, see generally Brown, The Right to Inspect Public Records
in Ohio, 37 OHIo ST. L.J. 518 (1976); Guy & McDonald, Government in the Sunshine: The
Status of Open Meetings and Open Records Laws in North Dakota, 53 N.D. L. REv. 51 (1976);
1975 ARiz. ST. L.J. 111; 64 Ky. L.J. 165 (1975-76); 53 ORE. L. REV. 354 (1974); 7 PAc. L.J. 105
(1976); 29 S.W.L.J. 431 (1975).
12.1. (1977).
13. See FLA. STAT. § 119.07 (1977).
14. Ch. 5942, 1909 Fla. Laws 132.
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the term "public record." But the Florida Supreme Court subse-
quently held that only those records "required by law to be kept, or
necessary to be kept in the discharge of a duty imposed by law, or
directed by law to serve as a memorial and evidence of something
written, said, or done" should be deemed "public" for purposes of
the statute.'5 This definition was somewhat restrictive of a citizen's
right of inspection, since it could effectively operate to exempt from
disclosure unofficial working papers, as well as materials which were
in the possession of a government agency but retention of which was
not mandated by law. The current definition of "public records" is
somewhat different: " 'Public records' means all documents, papers,
letters, maps, books, tapes, photographs, films, sound recordings or
other material, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made
or received pursuant to law or ordinance or in connection with the
transaction of official business by any agency."" The addition of the
phrase, "or in connection with the transaction of official business by
any agency," was a significant broadening of the previous judicially
formulated definition of a public record,'7 bringing the actual opera-
tion of the statute in line with the declared legislative policy."
The Public Records Act specifically exempts three categories of
documents from disclosure." The first somewhat generalized excep-
tion provides that "[a]ll public records which presently are pro-
vided by law to be confidential or which are prohibited from being
inspected by the public, whether by general or special law," are
immune from disclosure. 0 This wording has been interpreted to
include not only records exempted from disclosure by statute, but
also documents deemed confidential by common law2' and public
15. Amos v. Gunn, 94 So. 615, 634 (Fla. 1922).
16. FLA. STAT. § 119.011(1) (1977).
17. 1974 FLA. Arr'y GEN. Op. 074-215, at 2.
18. It should be noted that in 1975 the legislature amended FLA. STAT. § 119.011(2) to
define "agency" to include "any state, county, district, authority, or municipal officer, de-
partment, division, board, bureau, commission, or other separate unit of government created
or established by law and any other public or private agency, person, partnership, corpora-
tion, or business entity acting on behalf of any public agency. " Ch. 75-225, 1975 Fla. Laws
637 (emphasis added). After this revision, even a private person performing contract services
for an agency would have to make his records available for inspection. Compare Tindel v.
Sharp, 300 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 310 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 1975).
In this case, decided before the 1975 revision, the Florida First District Court of Appeal held
that a consultant employed by the Duval County School Board to seek candidates for a school
superintendent position was not an "agency" within the contemplation of the Act, and thus
his files were not public records subject to disclosure.
19. FLA. STAT. § 119.07(2)(a)-(c) (1977).
20. Id. § 119.07(2)(a). Examples of such statutory exemptions are found at id. §§ 231.29(3)
(assessment files of teaching personnel) and 447.605(3) (negotiations work product).
21. See 1972 FLA. Arr'y GEN. Op. 072-168 and 1973 FLA. Arr' GEN. Op. 073-166 for
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policy.2" Next, the Act exempts from disclosure those public records
referred to in certain specifically enumerated sections of the Florida
Statutes.2 Finally, the Act protects the confidentiality of the ques-
tions and answers of licensure, certification, or employment exami-
nations administered by governmental agencies. 4 While new excep-
tions continue to be carved out, 25 the limited statutory exemptions
in the Act, along with a firm legislative policy of openness in govern-
mental proceedings,2  combine to create a strong implication that
additional exclusions were not intended and should be avoided.2 7
In 1974 the legislature enacted part II of chapter 447, Florida
Statutes,2 8 providing statutory implementation of Florida public
employees' constitutional right to organize and bargain collec-
tively." Although meaningful collective bargaining ordinarily takes
place in closed-door sessions,30 the Florida Legislature, in keeping
discussion of exemption by common law (investigatory police records). In Florida, general
common law is in force by statute. FLA. STAT. § 2.01 (1977).
22. For good discussions of public policy exemptions from disclosure, see Lee v. Beach
Publishing Co., 173 So. 440 (Fla. 1937); Wisher v. News-Press Publishing Co., 310 So. 2d 345
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975). The latter case dealt with the question of whether the personnel
files of government employees are open to inspection under the Public Records Act. The court
held that public policy clearly dictates that these records should be deemed confidential and
thus not open to public inspection by the citizens of the state. The court noted that "the right
to know must occasionally be circumscribed when the potential damages far outweigh the
possible benefits." Id. at 348.
23. FLA. STAT. § 119.07(2)(b) (1977) exempts from disclosure: records of sexual offenses;
records of adoption proceedings; applications for bank charters and investigations; results of
domestic insurer examinations; intangible and estate tax returns; certain educational re-
cords; credit union records; documents on file with the Division of Economic Development;
and specific bank and trust company records on file with the Department of Banking and
Finance. See note 3 supra.
24. FLA. STAT. § 119.07(2)(c) (1977).
25. See note 3 supra.
26. See FLA. STAT. § 286.011(1) (1977). This section-"Government in the Sun-
shine"-provides:
All meetings of any board or commission of any state agency or authority or of any
agency or authority of any county, municipal corporation or any political subdivi-
sion, except as otherwise provided in the Constitution, at which official acts are to
be taken are declared to be public meetings open to the public at all times, and no
resolution, rule, regulation, or formal action shall be considered binding except as
taken or made at such meeting.
27. The Florida attorney general, for instance, in 1974 FLA. A'rr'y GEN. Op. 074-215, at 3,
noted that in Copeland v. Cartwright, 38 Fla. Supp. 6 (Cir. Ct. Broward County 1972), the
circuit court had expressly rejected the "work product" exemption from disclosure as unduly
infringing upon the public's right of access. In agreeing with the reasoning in that decision,
the attorney general retreated from several previous opinions insofar as they had declared a
valid exception for preliminary or work product materials.
28. Ch. 74-100, 1974 Fla. Laws 134.
29. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 6.
30. See Bassett v. Braddock, 262 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1972). In this case, decided before
passage of Florida's public employee collective bargaining act, the supreme court affirmed a
1978]
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with the state's commitment to openness in government, expressly
provided that formal negotiating sessions would be open to the pub-
lic, thus protecting the public's right to observe a significant govern-
mental activity. At the same time, the Act allowed the public em-
ployer to meet with its chief negotiator in private strategy sessions, 3'
and specifically exempted the negotiations work product materials
prepared by the public employer from disclosure under the Public
Records Act. 32 Thus, this portion of the public employees bargaining
act capsulizes the struggle to balance the right of public access to
all the activities of government against the need to protect the pub-
lic interest in the sensitive areas of the public employee collective
bargaining process. The case under discussion here arose in just
such a context of competing public policies.
The single issue presented in the Bartow case is whether the Pub-
lic Records Act requires the Public Employees Relations Commis-
sion to produce for inspection, upon request by an interested party
and before a formal charge is filed, affidavits and other documents
secured by a Commission investigator in the process of investigating
an unfair labor practice charge. The First District Court of Appeal
disposed summarily of the basic questions-it found that the Com-
mission was a state agency created by statute; that the investigator
was the agent of the Commission, performing a statutory function;
lower court holding that a school board representative could engage in preliminary or tenta-
tive contract negotiations with teachers' representatives in private meetings without violating
the "sunshine law." The court noted the presence of "impressive, uncontroverted testimony
by respectable national authorities in the field, that meaningful collective bargaining in the
circumstances here would be destroyed if full publicity were accorded at each step of the
negotiations." Id. at 426 (emphasis added). See also Recchie, Government in the Sunshine:
Open Meeting Legislation in Ohio, 37 Omo ST. L.J. 497, 511 (1976), in which the author
observes that "im]eaningful collective bargaining could be seriously hampered if each step
of the negotiations had to be taken publicly," and notes that Ohio's open meetings act allows
the public body to hold an executive session in order to prepare for, conduct, or review
bargaining sessions with public employees. In 1975 ARiz. ST. L.J. 111, 129 (1975), a discussion
of public access to meetings and documents in Arizona, the commentator noted that
"[c]ollective bargaining is another situation where there is a recognized need for secrecy."
Under Maine's public access statutes, bargaining materials are specifically exempted from
disclosure and executive sessions are allowed for the purpose of conducting contract negotia-
tions, unless both parties agree to bargain in public. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, §§ 401-410
(Supp. 1976-77). New York similarly specifies that public bodies may conduct collective
bargaining in executive sessions. N.Y. PUa. OFF. LAW §§ 90-101 (Supp. 1976-77).
31. See generally Bassett v. Braddock, 262 So. 2d at 428. In Bassett, the Florida Supreme
Court declared that such private strategy sessions were necessary if the public employer was
not to be at a great disadvantage in actual contract negotiations.
32. FLA. STAT. § 447.605(1)-(3) (1977).
33. FLA. STAT. § 447.503(1) (1977) provides that the Commission or its agent "shall con-
duct a preliminary investigation to determine if there is substantial evidence indicating a
prima facie violation of the applicable unfair labor practice provision."
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and that the documents thus "made or received pursuant to law"'34
were encompassed by the Public Records Act.35 The City contended
that, as public records, the documents were subject to examination
by anyone at reasonable times and under reasonable conditions. 3
The Commission argued that disclosure of the records would jeop-
ardize the ongoing investigation and create a substantial risk of
retaliatory or coercive measures by the employer against the em-
ployees. Thus, it urged that such records should be exempt from
inspection on public policy grounds. 37
The court had little Florida case law to provide guidance in this
area. Public employee bargaining, as well as litigation under the
Public Employees Relations Act, was new to the state. However, a
significant case concerning the Commission's statutory duty to per-
mit examination of union authorization cards signed by public em-
ployees seeking representation-School Board of Marion County v.
Public Employees Relations Commission-had been decided by the
Florida Supreme Court in June, 1976.3 In that case a union had
filed a petition with the Commission seeking certification as the
bargaining agent for certain employees of the School Board of Mar-
ion County. Pursuant to Florida law, 9 signed authorization cards
representing at least thirty percent of the proposed bargaining unit
accompanied the petition. The school board sought access to these
cards under the Public Records Act and additionally alleged an
absolute right of access under section 447.307(2), Florida Statutes. 0
The Commission denied inspection on grounds of public policy,
arguing that unlimited access to authorization cards is not permit-
ted in other jurisdictions or under the National Labor Relations Act,
and that to allow it would have a "chilling" effect on the exercise
of bargaining rights by public employees.4' In an opinion written by
Justice England, the Florida Supreme Court rejected the Commis-
sion's assertion that the cards were absolutely exempt from disclo-
sure absent factual proof before the Commission of collusion or
34. FLA. STAT. § 119.011(1) (1977).
35. 341 So. 2d at 1002.
36. Id. at 1001.
37. Id. at 1002.
38. School Bd. of Marion County v. Public Employees Relations Comm'n, 334 So. 2d 582
(Fla. 1976).
39. FLA. STAT. § 447.307(2) (1977).
40. The school board based its contention on the following statutory language: "Any
employee, employer, or employee organization having sufficient reason to believe any of the
employee signatures were obtained by collusion, coercion, intimidation, or misrepresentation,
or are otherwise invalid, shall be given a reasonable opportunity to verify and challenge the
signatures appearing on the petition." Id. § 447.307(2).
41. 334 So. 2d at 583 n.3.
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other specified grounds for review. Rather, the court held that if the
employer alleges one of the statutory grounds for review of the cards,
then access to them must be granted. In the absence of such an
allegation, the Commission may properly deny the right to inspect.
The decision resulted in denial of access since the School Board had
merely made a general request to examine the cards and had not
charged that they were insufficient on the basis of collusion, intimi-
dation, coercion, or misrepresentation. The court specifically noted
that the statute calls for a hearing for purposes of employer chal-
lenge if the petition, after Commission investigation, appears suffi-
cient on its face, 2 and observed that "the right of challenge would
be meaningless if an employer who alleges one of the statutory
grounds for invalidation is denied access until the hearing is held. '43
The Marion decision was based on statutory interpretation of the
bargaining law itself. However, Justice England observed in a foot-
note that because the bargaining statute provides for access to the
cards only on a limited basis and to a narrowly defined class of
interested persons, it may actually operate as a new exemption to
the Public Records Act."
42. FLA. STAT. § 447.307(3)(a) (1977).
43. 334 So. 2d at 584.
44. Id. at 584-85 n.10. The bargaining statute itself expressly provides for two exceptions
from public inspection under the Public Records Act: the work products developed by the
employer in preparation for and during negotiations need not be disclosed, FLA. STAT. §
447.605(3) (1977), and the draft orders developed by PERC in preparation for or preliminary
to the issuance of a final written order are exempt from disclosure under the Act, id. §
447.205(10). However, as Justice England observed, the plain language of FLA. STAT. §
447.307(2) (1977) would seem to restrict access to the employee authorization cards to inter-
ested parties only, in the context of a verification proceeding. It follows from that interpreta-
tion that the general public would be denied access to the authorization petitions, thus
creating a further exception to the Public Records Act.
See also United Faculty of Florida v. Branson, 350 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977)
(Smith, J.). In Branson the court was required to decide, inter alia, whether professors seeking
access to faculty signature cards were improperly denied inspection under the bargaining
statute and the Public Records Act. Finding that the demand of the professors was untimely,
and thus that it was proper for the Commission to deny access, the court also commented on
the reasoning in Marion:
[Tihe Supreme Court held . .. that the Marion County School Board had not
satisfied formal requirements of Section 447.307(2) for inspection of signature
cards, and so denied the School Board's request for inspection without prejudice
to renewal in proper form. The Court denied the Marion County School Board's
claim to free access under Chapter 119, saying "[tio this extent section 447.307(2)
may actually operate as an exemption to section 119.01 as recognized in section
119.07(2)(a)." (emphasis added) While the Court's language was tentative, its de-
nial of relief under Chapter 119 was unequivocal. Thus, signature cards discovera-
ble under PERC restrictions are exempt from the free access provided by the Public
Records Law, Chapter 119.
Id. at 492 (footnote omitted).
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Although the Bartow case involved a different portion of the bar-
gaining statute, the unfair labor practice section,' 5 the court was
obviously influenced strongly by the reasoning in Marion. It rejected
out of hand a blanket exemption for sensitive investigatory materi-
als on the basis of confidentiality and public policy, noting, as did
Justice England in Marion, that any abuses flowing from the em-
ployer's access to the records could themselves be remedied under
the unfair labor practice portion of the Act." The district court of
appeal also adopted reasoning similar to that of the supreme court
regarding the statutory guarantee of an appeal by the charging
party if the charge is dismissed.' 7 The court of appeal interpreted
the statute to mean that a charging party whose charge was dropped
"must have access to the investigatory materials in order to present
a meaningful appeal . . . ."" This was similar to the supreme
court's characterization in Marion of an employer's right to chal-
lenge the validity of signatures on authorization cards at a hearing
as "meaningless if an employer who alleges one of the statutory
grounds for invalidation is denied access until the hearing is held."4
The cases seem firmly in agreement, then, that where a hearing or
an appeals procedure statutorily provides for review of the suffi-
ciency of either a representation petition or an unfair labor practice
charge, the parties must have full access to relevant documents in
advance of the hearing if the procedure is to have any real value.
But the Bartow court departed from the Marion approach and
returned to the Public Records Act as the basis of its decision.50 The
court noted that there is a need to release investigative materials
when a disappointed charging party wishes to appeal the dismissal
of an unfair labor practice charge, or after a formal charge is filed,
based on evidence of a prima facie violation. Under these circum-
stances, the court said, there is no reason not to release such materi-
45. FLA. STAT. § 447.503 (1977).
46. 341 So. 2d at 1003, citing School Bd. of Marion County v. Public Employees Relations
Comm'n, 334 So. 2d at 585.
47. FLA. STAT. § 447.503(3) (1977) states: "A charging party whose charge is thus dis-
missed may appeal to the commission, and, if the commission finds substantial evidence of
a meritorious charge, that charge shall be reinstated .
48. 341 So. 2d at 1002.
49. 334 So. 2d at 584.
50. The Marion decision was based on interpretation of the bargaining statute. The ra-
tionale employed did not require the Marion court to determine whether the statute had, in
effect, amended the public records law by creating a new exemption. Justice England raised
the question in a footnote, but left the issue unanswered since such a finding was not required
for resolution of the case. 334 So. 2d at 584-85 n.10. See also note 42 supra; United Faculty
of Florida v. Branson, 350 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (signature cards discovera-
ble under PERC restrictions exempt from free access provided by public records act).
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als.11 It might be assumed that the court, seemingly proceeding in
the direction of absolute disclosure, would open to full scrutiny all
records accumulated by the Commission agent in the course of the
preliminary unfair labor practice investigation. But this was not the
result.
The court instead looked to that language of the Public Records
Act which provided that public records should be made available
to anyone desiring to see them "at reasonable times, under reasona-
ble conditions, and under supervision by the custodian of the re-
cords. '52 The court concluded that this wording was sufficient to
protect the investigator from work interruptions by individuals
wishing to inspect every note or affidavit contemporaneous with its
making. The court pointed out that this preliminary investigatory
process was nonadversary and should not be unduly compromised
or encumbered by demands for disclosure by either party. The court
held:
To preserve the integrity of the sensitive investigatory process,
while giving full effect to statutory policy favoring disclosure, it is
appropriate for the Commission and its investigating agent to post-
pone public disclosure of investigatory materials for a reasonable
time until the Commission or investigating agent has either dis-
missed the charge as groundless or has determined there is sub-
stantial evidence of a prima facie violation.53
The court explained that at the point indicated for disclosure, the
proceeding would have become an adversary one and release of the
information would not threaten the completed investigation. Fur-
ther, remedies were available under statuteH if an investigation was
unreasonably delayed and disclosure of public records was thereby
thwarted. 55 By invoking the statutory limitation of "reasonable-
ness" on a party's right to inspect certain public records, the court
found a method of protecting a sensitive area of the public employee
51. 341 So. 2d at 1002-03.
52. FLA. STAT. § 119.07(1) (1977).
53. 341 So. 2d at 1003 (emphasis added).
54. FLA. STAT. § 120.68 (1977) (Florida Administrative Procedure Act). The Act provides
that a party who is adversely affected by final agency action is entitled to judicial review of
that decision.
55. In the Bartow court's hypothetical, if a preliminary investigation were extended over
an unreasonable length of time, without disclosure of the investigative documents, the party
seeking access to the materials would apply to the Commission for their disclosure. If the
Commission should refuse to divulge the records, its action would be reviewable by the
appropriate district court of appeal upon petition by the aggrieved party. See 341 So. 2d at
1003; FLA. STAT. § 120.68 (1977).
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bargaining process, while at the same time preserving the ultimate
right of the parties and the public to inspect official documents.
Whether governed by statutory or common-law rules, the right of
access to public documents is generally subject to reasonable rules
and regulations as to when, where, and how the inspection may be
made in order to avoid undue disruption of the functioning of the
office in which the records are maintained." These limitations were
recognized in an early Florida case, Davis v. McMillan,57 which held
that the citizen's statutory right of access to records must be exer-
cised in a reasonable and orderly manner, at reasonable hours and
times, and with due regard to the official rights of the custodian of
the records. However, the legislature did not incorporate "at reason-
able times" into the statutory language until 1967, and did not
include the phrase "under reasonable conditions" until the 1975
amendments." Cases which have dealt with the "reasonableness"
of restrictions on access have focused, almost exclusively, on the
right of the custodian to allow access to public documents only
during reasonable hours-generally the regular office hours of the
agency 59-and only under those conditions which will insure the
physical safety of the records and prevent disruption of the agency. 0
It follows that the concept of reasonableness as a qualification on a
person's right of access to public documents is basically procedural,
designed both to prevent public officials from arbitrarily restricting
times and facilities for inspection, and to deter citizens from de-
stroying records or unnecessarily interfering with the regular duties
of the public agency.
The Bartow court, however, has given statutory "reasonableness"
restrictions a substantive, rather than procedural, cast."' In this
56. See, e.g., Holcombe v. Chandler, 200 So. 739 (Ala. 1941); Bruce v. Gregory, 423 P.2d
193 (Cal. 1967); Pressman v. Elgin, 50 A.2d 560 (Md. 1947); Halloran v. McGrath, 67 P.2d
838 (Mont. 1937). Of the forty-six states having public records statutes (see note 12 supra),
twenty-four statutes employ the terms "reasonable" or "proper" in qualifying the times at
which records are accessible, or the rules by which the records custodian may limit inspection.
Eighteen statutes simply provide that records are accessible during regular office hours. Four
statutes provide a general, unqualified grant of access.
57. 38 So. 666 (Fla. 1905).
58. Ch. 67-125, 1967 Fla. Laws 254; ch. 75-225, 1975 Fla. Laws 637.
59. E.g., Upton v. Catlin, 31 P. 172 (Colo. 1892); Davis v. McMillan, 38 So. 666 (Fla.
1905); Pressman v. Elgin, 50 A.2d 560 (Md. 1947).
60. Bruce v. Gregory, 423 P.2d 193, 199 (Cal. 1967), held that the statutory right of
inspection is "subject to an implied rule of reason," and that the records custodian must act
tb prevent "chaos" in the record archives. Marsh v. Sanders, 34 So. 752, 755 (La. 1903), held
that a sheriff could make reasonable rules governing records inspection to protect his office
from "vexatious" interference.
61. Compare Butcher v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 61 A.2d 367 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1948), a case
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decision, the "reasonable times" language is used to prevent disclo-
sure of the documents until such time as the unfair labor practice
proceeding is dismissed or becomes adversary in nature, 2 rather
than to compel inspection during the regular office hours of the
Commission or its investigator. The court did not cite any decisions,
from either Florida or other jurisdictions, interpreting the concept
of "reasonableness" as a positive limitation on the citizen's right to
inspect public records open for inspection "at all times." 3 It is also
noteworthy that neither party's brief mentioned the "reasonable
times, reasonable conditions" section of the statute as being of any
interest or significance.
In 1972, in Copeland v. Cartwright," the Broward County Circuit
Court held in a sweeping opinion that there was no general "work
product" exemption in Florida which would preclude a petitioner
from examining preliminary site plan reviews prepared by a munici-
pal planning technician. The court expressly rejected the reasoning
in prior Florida Attorney General Opinions upholding a work prod-
uct exemption, 5 considering it too restrictive of the public's right
to know. Instead, the court embraced a broad definition of public
records as "all writings which are in the custody of public serv-
ants."6 In a later opinion on the validity of the "work product"
exception to the Public Records Act, 7 the attorney general recog-
nized that Florida's statute, unlike the Federal Freedom of Informa-
tion Act (FOIA),18 granted no specific exemption for work papers.
Acknowledging that statutes providing access to public records
should be liberally construed in favor of inspection, 9 and that ex-
emptions from public examination should be narrow,70 the attorney
general applauded the reasoning and result in Copeland and re-
ceded from his previous opinions recognizing a general work product
which employed similar reasoning to that of Bartow. In Butcher, the court held that where
the right to inspect old civil service examinations was subject to reasonable regulations as to
the time of inspection, an applicant for the examination was not entitled to request the
previous examination copy on the eve of the test.
62. 341 So. 2d at 1003.
63. Id. n.4.
64. 38 Fla. Supp. 6 (Cir. Ct. Broward County 1972).
65. 1961 FLA. Arr'y GEN. OP. 061-102, 1966 FLA. AT'V GEN. OP. 066-88, 1971 FLA. Arr'y
GEN. OP. 071-376, and 1972 FLA. Arr'v GEN. OP. 072-323 all recognized exceptions to the
Public Records Act for preliminary or work product materials.
66. 38 Fla. Supp. at 12.
67. 1974 FLA. ATr'y GEN. OF. 074-215.
68. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1970).
69. Citing Gibson v. Peller, 181 N.E.2d 376 (Ill. App. 1962).
70. Citing Caswell v. Manhattan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 399 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1968).
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exception.7' In Gannett Co. v. Goldtrap,72 a mandamus proceeding
brought to compel disclosure of a written appraisal in connection
with negotiations for a landfill site, the Second District Court of
Appeal held that the appraisal report was a public record neither
exempted from inspection by statute nor confidential under com-
mon law; thus it had to be made available for public inspection,
even if this was harmful to ongoing negotiations. At the time of the
Bartow decision, then, Florida law did not recognize a general "work
product" exception to the Public Records Act.
The Bartow court distinguished the Gannett holding, upon which
the City relied heavily, by stating that it would only have been
controlling if the Gannett court had ordered the disclosure of the
appraiser's field notes, computations, and records of interviews with
property owners, rather than his finished product. Thus, the Bartow
decision has revived the issue of whether a valid "work product"
exception to the Public Records Act exists, the question which
Gannett had previously appeared to answer in the negative.
The Bartow court exhibited a certain ambiguity in its attitude
toward the need for confidentiality in investigatory proceedings.
Under Florida law some records "must be kept secret and free from
common inspection" on public policy grounds.73 These records have
been deemed to include information obtained from investigations of
criminal matters by police and state attorneys.74 The First District
Court of Appeal declared that the investigation of an unfair labor
practice charge was not analogous to such criminal investigations,
relying on the supreme court decision in Marion and the presence
of a statutory remedy for abuse of access within the bargaining
statute. Yet the language of the entire Bartow opinion is permeated
by an awareness of the sensitive nature of the investigation and a
recognition of the need to protect the investigatory process from
compromise or undue interference by interested parties. By invok-
ing the "reasonable times" limitation on disclosure, the court
shielded the preliminary investigation from view as effectively as if
the Public Records Act contained a specific statutory exemption for
preliminary investigatory files compiled for enforcement of statu-
tory provisions relating to unfair labor practices.7 5
71. 1974 FLA. ATr'v GEN. Op. 074-215 at 3.
72. 302 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
73. Lee v. Beach Publishing Co., 173 So. 440, 442 (Fla. 1937).
74. 1976 FLA. ATr'y GEN. Op. 076-156; 1973 FLA. Arr'y GEN. Op. 073-166; 1972 FLA. Arr'y
GEN. Op. 072-168.
75. Several states have provided a general statutory exemption from disclosure for investi-
gatory records compiled for enforcement proceedings. E.g., Ky. REV. STAT. § 61.878(f) (Supp.
1976); MD. ANN. CODE art. 76A, § 3 (1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 1A-3 (West Supp. 1977-78);
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The result in Bartow is consistent with a recent, similar case cited
in the Commission brief involving the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB). In Title Guarantee Co. v. NLRB,78 employee state-
ments obtained by the NLRB prior to a hearing on an unfair labor
practice charge were deemed exempt from disclosure. The circuit
court found that such documents fell within the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act (FOIA) exemption for investigatory records compiled for
law enforcement purposes, since production of such records could
compromise the law enforcement proceedings.77 The Second Circuit
expressly construed the exemption as narrowly as possible, noting
that the thrust of the Federal FOIA has been to provide for disclo-
sure in the absence of an established exemption, but also expressing
its conviction that if employee statements were prematurely dis-
closed in such a factual setting, interference with the investigation
could result. The court said, "Absent a clearer indication of contrary
congressional intent, we are not prepared to hold that disclosure
may be required under the FOIA in connection with an ongoing
unfair labor practice enforcement proceeding." 8
Although Judge Smith did not cite the Title Guarantee case in
his Bartow opinion, and although Bartow is based on a different
disclosure statute from the statute construed in Title Guarantee,
the result is the same. Both cases protect similar records from dis-
closure; even the language and thrust of the opinions are similar.7"
Such similarity hints strongly that the NLRB decisions may well
influence the thinking and the decisions of Florida courts in the area
of labor relations.
What, then, is the effect of this decision? Are the holding and the
reasoning in Bartow destined to encourage, on the basis of
'reasonableness," widespread limitations on public access to
records? It is possible, if not likely, that some public entities inter-
ested in preserving their operational privacy may attempt to invoke
the rationale of Bartow. But this case can and should properly be
N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAw § 88 (McKinney Supp. 1976-77); OR. REv. STAT. § 192.500(h) (1975). The
Kentucky statute prohibits disclosure only if the disclosure would harm the agency law
enforcement effort, and further provides that the files shall be open after the enforcement
proceedings are concluded, or after a decision is made to take no action.
76. 534 F.2d 484 (2d Cir. 1976).
77. The FOIA contains a specific exemption for investigatory records compiled for law
enforcement purposes, to the extent that disclosure would prejudice the enforcement proceed-
ing. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1970).
78. 534 F.2d at 491.
79. Judge Smith reasoned: "Nothing short of an explicit statutory imperative should
require the Commission's preliminary investigation to be so compromised. The Public Re-
cords Act does not mandate such intrusions into the Commission's preliminary investigation
. .. 341 So. 2d at 1003.
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limited to its particular factual situation in the public employee
bargaining context. The state is committed to a public policy of
openness and governmental accessibility, and it is unlikely that the
courts will lightly turn away from this tradition by extending the
rule in Bartow to other areas.
The Bartow court was caught in the crossfire between competing
public policies of great strength: a commitment to protect the rights
of public employees to organize and bargain collectively guaranteed
by the Florida Constitution and an obligation to uphold the public's
right of access to all records in the possession of public officials and
agencies. The court succeeded in Bartow in balancing these policies
judiciously. The special problems and considerations inherent in the
public employee collective bargaining process may well require fu-
ture weighing and balancing efforts in the courts and the legislature,
both in the context of the Public Records Act and in other statutory
areas.
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